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A comprehensive approach to managing risk must draw on both the descriptive insights of the 
behavioral sciences and the prescriptive clarity of the management sciences. On the descriptive 
side, this study develops structural models to explain how the impact upon society of an accident 
or other unfortunate event is influenced by the physical consequences of the event, perceived risk, 
media coverage, and public response. Our findings indicate that the media and public response play 
crucial roles in determining the impact of an unfortunate event. Public response appears to be deter-
mined by perceptions that the event was caused by managerial incompetence and is a signal of future 
risk. On the prescriptive side, we briefly discuss how these findings based upon structural models can 
be incorporated into a decision-analytic procedure known as an influence diagram. 
Risk perception; social amplification; impact analysis; structural models; influence diagram. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Risk research in the social sciences has developed 
along two important but distinct paths. Behavioral sci-
entists have sought to describe how people and institu-
tions perceive and respond to risk, while management 
scientists have attempted to develop methods that pre-
scribe appropriate actions for managers to take. Despite 
significant progress in these separate areas, there is still 
no comprehensive approach that integrates our under-
standing of how a society experiences risk with formal 
methods of decision-making (e.g., cost-benefit analysis 
and decision analysis). Managers continue, for example, 
to be surprised and dismayed when "minor events," as 
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assessed by experts, spark great alarm and subsequent 
societal disruption. 
A comprehensive approach to managing risk must 
draw upon the descriptive insights of the behavioral sci-
ences and the prescriptive strengths of the management 
sciences. Formal analytic methods, for example, typi-
cally have assessed the impact of accidents or other ad-
verse events in terms of expected loss of life or property 
damage. The contribution of these methods has been to 
provide risk managers with explicit guidance, using cri-
teria that are well defined. A nice illustration of these 
methods can be seen in Keeney, (1) who develops a utility 
model for evaluating potential fatalities and associated 
uncertainties of occurrence. The effect of fatalities on 
the public is evaluated in terms of the direct personal 
impacts of suffering and economic hardship and the in-
direct societal impacts of possible political and economic 
turmoil. Keeney's disaggregation of impacts into per-
sonal and societal is insightful, and his approach leads 
to clear recommendations for action. However, focusing 
on fatalities or related criteria may not adequately antici-
pate public concerns as perceptions of threat and social 
response appear less a matter of physical outcomes than 
of attitudes, social influences, and cultural identity. (2) 
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Research from multiple disciplines may help broaden 
the criteria considered by prescriptive methods. Psycho-
metric research, (3) for instance, has identified numerous 
factors that appear related to perception and acceptance 
of risk, such as voluntary exposure, controllability, fa-
miliarity, and perceived catastrophic potential. Socio-
logical analysis has examined social and organizational 
factors that influence risk experiences, (4,5) the capability 
of risk management institutions to cope with large-scale 
risks, (6,7) and perceived equity in the distribution of risks 
and benefits. (8,9) 
Providing managers with a better understanding of 
how society perceives and responds to risk will help 
managers make more informed decisions. Likewise, de-
veloping better prescriptive strategies will also contrib-
ute to improved risk decisions even if these strategies 
largely ignore societal perceptions. The challenge, how-
ever, is to draw on the knowledge, theories, and meth-
odological tools of each perspective to provide risk 
managers with comprehensive and well-formulated rec-
ommendations. 
Our paper discusses methodological and theoretical 
developments in the social sciences that may contribute 
to a more comprehensive approach to risk management. 
It also describes, briefly, how these developments can 
be combined with more formal methods of risk analysis. 
2. MODELING THE SOCIAL AMPLIFICATION 
OF RISK: AN EXAMINATION OF A HAZARD 
DATA BASE USING STRUCTURAL MODELS 
2.1. Description of Theory and Relationships 
Among Model Constructs 
Aiming to link the technical assessment of risk with 
psychological and cultural perspectives on risk-relateu 
behavior, Kasperson et al. (10) proposed a theoretical 
framework labeled "the social amplification of risk." 
According to the social amplification model, the effects 
of an adverse event such as an accident sometimes ex-
tend far beyond the direct damages to victims, property, 
and environment and may result in massive indirect im-
pacts. The theory postulates that the social and economic 
impacts of an adverse event are determined not only by 
the direct biological and physical consequences of the 
event, but by the interaction of powerful psychological, 
cultural, social, and institutional processes that amplify 
or attenuate public response to the event. When an event 
occurs, information regarding the event flows through 
various channels to the public and its many cultural and 
social groups. This information is interpreted largely on 
the basis of its interaction with the above processes which, 
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in tum, triggers risk-related behavior. Such behavior, to-
gether with the influence of the media and special interest 
groups, generates secondary social and economic conse-
quences that eventually call for additional institutional re-
sponses and protective actions (or, in the case of risk 
attenuation, eventually impede protective actions). 
In the present study, we investigate the social am-
plification theory by developing structural models based 
on factors assumed to contribute to an event's impact. 
The theoretical models are tested using judgments ob-
tained from samples of laypersons and experts. The fac-
tors in the models include the event's physical 
consequences, associated risk perception characteristics, 
media coverage, and ability to stimulate public response. 
The hypothesized relationships among these factors are 
depicted in Fig. 1. 
In Fig. 1, Public Response (degree to which the 
public becomes involved with reducing a hazard's risk) 
and Media Coverage (volume of news coverage) are 
assumed to have a strong, positive, and direct effect on 
an event's impact. The nature of these effects is illus-
trated by the single-headed arrows connecting these two 
factors with Societal Impact. For example, the media 
and public may put pressure on policy-makers to in-
crease regulation of a hazard as a result of some mishap. 
This could result in substantial costs to a particular firm 
or industry. 
The Physical Consequences of an event (number 
of people and amount of property directly exposed to 
risk or actually harmed by the event) may also have a 
direct and positive effect on its impact. However, ac-
cording to the theory, an event's physical consequences 
< ~ - 
~ 
Causal path Theorized but not Correlational path 
estimated path 
Fig. 1. Proposed model prior to interaction with data (all constructs 
have mUltiple measures). 
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will have their primary influence by stimulating media 
coverage and public reaction. Examples of this phenom-
enon are events in which large numbers of people are 
exposed to risk, though few are actually harmed. Per-
ceived exposure to risk may stimulate media and public 
attention and thus have a large indirect impact without 
having much direct impact. 
Finally, it is hypothesized that an event's Risk Sig-
nal (degree to which an event leads the public to believe 
that a new risk has appeared or that the risk is different 
and more serious than previously thought) will have a 
strong, positive, and direct effect on Public Response. (3) 
It is further hypothesized, however, that Risk Signal 
will influence an event's Societal Impact only indirectly 
through its ability to incite Public Response. It is ex-
pected that adverse events inspiring dread, or believed 
to be managed incompetently, or perceived to pose fu-
ture danger to others will be viewed as high signal events 
and will elicit strong public reaction that in turn may 
affect a firm or an industry. For example, events sur-
rounding nuclear power generally have high signal 
value,<ll) and this helps explain the public's reaction to 
the accident at Three Mile Island and to other, lesser, 
problems in the nuclear industry. The theory also sug-
gests that the amount of media coverage should influence 
how the public perceives and responds to a hazard event. 
This contention is portrayed by the dashed arrows in Fig. 
1. However, this influence path cannot be examined in 
this study because the respondents providing information 
on these variables were not differentially exposed to me-
dia coverage. For many respondents this survey may 
have represented their only exposure to an event regard-
less of how much media coverage it received. 
2.2. Operationalizing the Model 
In Fig. 1 we provided the general intuition behind the 
social amplification process and specified the expected re-
lationships among its constructs. However, estimation and 
theory testing require that these abstract constructs be tied 
to measurable phenomena. Hence, we now describe how 
each construct was measured and we provide a brief dis-
cussion of the structural model investigated. 
The model used to estimate the relations depicted 
in Fig. 1 is shown in Fig. 2, and its measured variables 
are discussed in Table I. For purposes of estimation, we 
represent an event's physical consequences by three con-
structs describing the size of the event (Event Scale), 
the number of people harmed (Casualties), and the amount 
of property damaged (Property Damaged). Likewise, 
we capture Risk Signal by Perceived Managerial In-
competence and Future Risk. Variables depicted with 
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ovals are latent constructs and are represented by mul-
tiple measures. For example, Societal Impact is mea-
sured by an assessment of the political and economic 
impacts of each event. Some constructs, such as Cas-
ualties, have only one measure and are depicted with 
squares. Single-headed arrows imply causality, while 
double-headed arrows imply only correlation. Some causal 
paths such as from Casualties to Public Response do 
not appear because they were statistically insignificant 
and so were removed from our proposed model. The 
same is true for a number of correlational paths. The 
findings from this estimation will be discussed in a later 
section. 
2.3. Description and Selection of the Adverse 
Events Data Base 
The adverse events selected for this study included 
routine as well as unexpected events and included mis-
haps as well as reports of potential dangers. Almost all 
events occurred in North America during the 10-year 
period between 1976 and 1987. A comprehensive set 
of events was selected with guidance from a taxonomy 
of hazards suggested by Hohenemser et at. (12) Their 
taxonomy characterizes hazard events as belonging to 
Fig. 2. Covariance structure model for sample 1. 
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Table I. Description of Model Variables for Each Construct 
EVENT SCALEa 
Exposureb 
Areab 
The number of people exposed to harm from a hazard 
The amount of area exposed to harm from a hazard 
CASUALTIES 
Casualtiesb The number of people injured or killed by a hazard 
PROPERTY DAMAGE 
Property Damageb The amount of monetary damage to property from a hazard 
MEDIA COVERAGE 
Nstories' 
Duration' 
Half-life' 
The number of follow-up news stories reporting on a hazard 
The number of days between the first and last news stories 
The number of days until half the news stories appeared 
RISK SIGNAL 
Future Risk" 
Perceived Managerial 
Incompetence' 
Degree to which other people are at risk of experiencing harm from future hazards of this type 
Degree to which the public believes that a hazard implies that similar risks are being managed incompetently 
PUBLIC RESPONSE 
Political Involvement 
Worry" 
Degree to which the public is willing to become politically involved to reduce future risks posed by a hazard 
Degree to which the public worries about the risks posed by a hazard 
Risk-Reducing Action' Degree to which the public is willing to become actively involved (e.g., joining an action-oriented group) to 
reduce future risks posed by a hazard 
SOCIETAL IMPACT 
Political Impact! 
Economic Impact 
Degree to which a hazard generates political attention by public officials 
Degree to which a hazard generates economic impacts (e.g., loss of sales, increased costs due to regulation) 
a Constructs are given in capital letters. 
b Assessed by risk experts at Clark University on a scale of 1-9. 
, Data generated from Nexis data base. 
d Rated by University of Oregon students on a scale of 1-7 (during phase I) and 0-8 (during phase II). 
, Rated by University of Oregon students on a scale of 0-8. 
f Assessed by a Delphi panel of professionals on a scale of 0-10. 
five classes: Biocidal (e.g., vaccines), Persistent/De-
layed effects (e.g., mercury release), Rare Catastro-
phes (e.g., airplane crashes), Threats to Life (e.g., 
smoking), and Global/Diffuse Hazards (e.g., CO2 re-
lease). Radiological Hazards (e.g., nuclear accidents) 
were also included. 
Events representing each of the classes were iden-
tified through a search of the New York Times Index. 
Using this Index as a list from which to sample, events 
were chosen to represent a wide range of consequences 
pertaining to people and the environment. Within each 
class, effort was made to balance the distribution of re-
cent and less-recent events. Each class had approxi-
mately the same number of events. Data were collected 
on 108 events and these events provided the stimuli upon 
which expert and public assessment was based. 
Respondents received a brief news clipping for each 
event or report. A group of risk experts received a syn-
opsis of the actual news story, while the nonexperts re-
ceived an even briefer version of the story, omitting 
names and extraneous details. For example, one partic-
ular news story covering the side effects of a vaccination 
read "Joshua Reed received his third DPT shot in Hall-
stead, PA. He had seizures and suffered brain damage." 
The modified version read "Child suffers brain damage 
from routine vaccination." 
2.4. Data Collection and Variable Description 
2.4_1. Physical Consequences 
The physical consequences of an event were ini-
tially divided into two categories: consequences affect-
ing human systems and consequences affecting nonhuman 
systems. Human systems consequences were measured 
by the number of people exposed to harm (Exposure) 
as well as by the severity of the harm (Casualties). Non-
human systems were measured by the estimated area of 
impact (Area) and the estimated dollar amounts of dam-
age (Property Damage). 
Structural Models in Risk Research 
All four physical consequence variables were mea-
sured on a scale ranging from 1-9, where the scale val-
ues were defined according to the guidelines given in 
Hohenemser et al. (12) Ratings of each event on all four 
variables were obtained through a consensus on the part 
of three experts (a physicist, chemist, and geographer) 
from the Hazard Assessment Group at Clark University. 
Where specific references to the extent of a mishap were 
not reported, the experts inferred the magnitude of the 
consequences. 
2.4.2. Media Coverage 
Identification of suitable news stories relied upon a 
manual search of The New York Times Index for cov-
erage of events representative of categories in the seven-
class taxonomy mentioned previously. The search pro-
vided index entries for all 108 hazard events. Once these 
stories were identified information from their index en-
tries was used to investigate follow-up coverage in NEWS, 
which is a group file in the Nexis data base. From this 
search, abstracts were obtained with information per-
taining to the number of follow-up stories covering or 
mentioning the event (Number of Stories), the duration 
of coverage for the event (Duration), and the number 
of days until half of the total stories on the event had 
appeared (Half-Life). 
2.4.3. Risk Perceptions and Public Response 
Data pertaining to people's perceptions of risk and 
their likely response to an adverse event were obtained 
using students at the University of Oregon. Scales mea-
suring Future Risk and Perceived Managerial Incom-
petence were investigated to assess the domain of risk 
signal. To understand better how risk perceptions trans-
late into political and economic impacts, information was 
sought pertaining to people's behavioral reaction to a 
hazard. However, it was not feasible to observe how the 
public would actually react, so information on their be-
havioral intentions was used as a proxy. Scales such as 
Political Involvement and Risk-Reducing Action were 
used instead to represent the public's response to hazard 
events. Respondents were asked to rate all 108 adverse 
events on a nine-point scale, for each of the risk per-
ception and public response variables. Ratings for each 
event on each variable were then averaged across re-
spondents to yield an aggregate score for each adverse 
615 
event on a particular variable. Examples of some of these 
scales are provided in Table II. 
2.4.4. Societal Impact 
The amount of sociopolitical attention (Political 
Impact) and socioeconomic impact (Economic Impact) 
were both assessed by a Delphi panel consisting of 12 
experts from the fields of risk analysis, journalism, law, 
and politics. The Delphi procedure consisted of three 
rounds of discussion and assessment in which three ex-
perts were randomly assigned to one of four groups for 
each of the rounds. Each group was asked to rate each 
event in terms of both Political Impact and Economic 
Impact on a scale of 0-10. The scores obtained from 
these three rounds were averaged to provide a single 
score on both variables for each event. 
2.5. Model Estimation Using Covariance Structure 
and Partial Least-Squares Modeling 
Covariance structure and partial least squares (PLS) 
modeling were used to investigate the social amplifica-
tion of risk framework as modeled in Fig. 2. Both these 
modeling tools are general multivariate procedures that 
allow a researcher to investigate the relationships among 
variables (latent or observed) of theoretical interest. These 
procedures augment exploratory methods such as factor 
analysis, multidimensional scaling, cluster analysis, and 
regression analysis that have been used to understand 
and predict public reaction to hazardous events. 
Covariance structure analysis and PLS represent 
complementary approaches to structural equation mod-
eling with the former being better suited for theory test-
ing and the latter for prediction. (13) Covariance structure 
modeling typically uses a full information (e.g;, maxi-
mum-likelihood or generalized least-squares) estimation 
approach. This full information approach potentially yields 
very efficient parameter estimates but also requires rel-
atively large samples and the assumption of multivariate 
normality. PLS uses a very different estimation ap-
proach, relying on iterative minimization of residual 
variance with respect to a subset of the parameters 
(given either fixed-point constraints or final estimates 
of other model parameters). (14) This approach has the 
advantage of requiring neither large samples nor spe-
cific distributional assumptions if parametric statisti-
cal tests are not desired (nonparametric procedures can 
be used to generate standard errors and assess model 
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Table II. Examples of Measures of Risk Signal and Public Response 
Perceived Managerial Incompetence (Risk Signal) 
In this question I'm interested in to what extent you think that those people in charge of these events or hazards are doing an adequate or competent 
job. Some events or types of hazards are more difficult to manage than others. Likewise, some hazards pose greater threats to general safety or 
well-being if not managed properly. Considering these factors, ask yourself whether this type of event or hazard is being managed competently by 
those in charge. Some events, all things considered, may lead you to believe that risks of this type are being managed well. While other events 
may lead you to believe that risks of this type are not being managed very well. 
To what extent does the event or hazard referred to in this story imply that the risks of this type are being managed properly by those in charge? 
It implies risks 
of this type 
are being 
managed properly o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
It implies risks of this type 
are not being managed 
properly 
Future Risk (Risk Signal) 
To what extent are other people at risk of experiencing harm from future events of this kind? 
Not at risk o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 At very great risk 
Political Involvement (Public Response) 
Some events concern us to the point of being willing to support political activity that would reduce future risks posed by a particular event. This 
involvement might take the form of signing a petition or writing letters to public officials. It could also mean donating money to or joining a 
political action group. While some events, though they may concern us, do not seem to have this effect on us. 
To what extent would this event cause you to become politically involved with reducing the future risks posed by this hazard? 
This event 
would not 
cause me to 
get very involved o 1 2 3 4 
adequacy), but yields less efficient estimates than 
maximum likelihood. 
Covariance structure and PLS models possess a 
number of advantages for development of comprehen-
sive theory in risk management. For example, they both 
are capable of incorporating an ever-expanding theoret-
ical and empirical knowledge about how society expe-
riences risk. This capability allows insights from many 
disciplines to be explicitly considered by risk managers. 
Likewise, these two approaches allow examination of 
the structural relationships among risk constructs that 
have emerged from exploratory procedures. They also 
permit an assessment of how well these constructs have 
been measured. Additionally, covariance structure and 
PLS modeling give unambiguous expression to the rel-
ative contribution of each model variable (directly or 
indirectly) to a dependent construct such as hazard im-
pact. Thus, they are helpful in the construction of pre-
scriptive models that seek to properly formulate risk 
decisions and estimate the probabilities of impact-related 
costs. (15) 
5 6 7 
2.6. Results7 
8 
This event would cause me 
to get very involved 
2.6.1. Description of Extreme Events 
A description of events scoring in the top or bottom 
5% is given in Table III for a selected number of model 
variables. These examples suggest that an event's news-
worthiness, ability to stimulate public reaction and even-
tual impact may have less to do with injuries or fatalities 
than with perceived potential to do harm. Observe, for 
Risk-Reducing Action that respondents indicated they 
would take little action to prevent fatalities resulting from 
an auto accident like the kind described in Table III but 
said they would be highly motivated to reduce the risk 
of a pesticide in food products. Similarly, for Perceived 
Managerial Incompetence the two events shown both 
7 A preliminary analysis of this data set has been presen ted by o. 
Renn, W.l. Burns, l.X. Kasperson, R.E. Kasperson, and P. Slovic 
in Journal of Social Issues 48, 137-160 (1992). 
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represent serious hazards. However, the event depicting 
a voluntary effort to correct the risk falls in the lowest 
5%, while the other event falls in the highest 5%. In this 
case, respondents viewed the former as demonstrating 
competent management. Perceptions that a firm is man-
aging a hazard properly signal less need to worry for the 
future and hence less felt need to take risk-reducing ac-
tion. 
2.6.2. Correlations Among Variables 
The correlations between model variables are pro-
vided in Table IV. Notice that variables measuring the 
same construct (enclosed), with one exception, are more 
correlated with each other than with other model varia-
bles. This is one indication that construct measures are 
performing as they should. As predicted, indicators of 
media coverage and public response are more related to 
event impact than are other model variables. Somewhat 
surprising is that the number of casualties has little cor-
relation with measures of public perceptions or response. 
This may again suggest that indications of injuries or 
fatalities alone do not trigger public reaction to a hazard 
event. 
2. 6.3. Covariance Structure Modeling 
The covariance structure model in Fig. 2 (its path 
coefficients and fit statistics are also provided in Table 
V) was estimated using a generalized least-squares pro-
cedure provided in a statistical package known as EQS. (16) 
To improve estimation, the distributions of all model 
variables were examined for normality and variables were 
transformed where necessary. For example, the mea-
sures of Societal Impact and Media Coverage were 
reexpressed using the natural log. Multivariate normality 
was then assessed using Mardia's coefficient, a statistic 
provided by the output of EQS. Mardia's coefficient sug-
gested the assumption of multivariate normality was 
plausible. 
All path estimates have been standardized; as a re-
sult, causal links (one-way arrows) are represented by 
standardized regression coefficients and covariance links 
(two-way arrows) are represented by correlation coeffi-
cients. For example, the standardized path coefficient 
linking Media Coverage with Societal Impact is .32. 
This means that events that are one standard deviation 
above the mean for Media Coverage tend, on average, 
to be .32 standard deviations above the mean for Socie-
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tal Impact. Likewise, the coefficients associated with 
paths connecting constructs with their measurement in-
dicators (i.e., measurement coefficients) are correlations 
and hence provide evidence of the relation between a 
construct and each of its measures. For instance, the 
measurement coefficients for Public Response range from 
.92-.94, indicating that they are highly correlated with 
the construct they are intended to measure. 
The overall fit for the model in Fig. 2 was assessed 
by examining the X2 statistic and the Bentler-Bonnet 
Normed Fit Index (NFl). The X2 statistic (X2 = 90.22, 
df = 67, P = .03) indicated that the model fit the data 
only marginally well (a P > .05 typically is considered 
acceptable). However, when correlations among ob-
served variables are high (see Table IV), the X2 test will 
tend to indicate a lack of fit even for models that fit the 
data well. The NFl, which compares the fit of the model 
to that of a model that claims there is no underlying 
correlational structure, was .99. The maximum value of 
the NFl is 1.00 and values over .9 are typically consid-
ered acceptable. Hence, taken together, these two in-
dices suggest the model is reasonably consistent with the 
data. 
The quality of measurement was investigated by 
examining both the size of the measurement coefficients 
and the tendency of measurement indicators to load on 
constructs other than the one they are supposed to mea-
sure. All indicators except Exposure have coefficients 
of .90 or above, suggesting they are highly related to 
their underlying constructs. There was little evidence to 
suggest that substantial improvements in model fit could 
be obtained by allowing measures, where plausible, to 
load on more than one construct. Hence, the model con-
stucts appear to be measured well. 
After one model revision in which insignificant paths 
were removed, all path coefficients in Fig. 2 are statis-
tically significant with the exception of the coefficients 
for paths linking Casualties and Property Damage with 
Societal Impact. The marginal direct influence of these 
two constructs on Societal Impact is important in light 
of the prominent role these two variables play in risk 
analysis. Hence, these paths were retained despite their 
small effect size. As anticipated, Media Coverage and 
Public Response exert a strong direct influence on So-
cietal Impact. Together, these four factors (Casualties, 
Property Damage, Media Coverage, and Public Re-
sponse) combined explain about 62% of the variance of 
Societal Impact. Event Scale, Casualties, and Prop-
erty Damage directly effect Media Coverage but ex-
plain only about 45% of its variance. Future Risk, 
Perceived Managerial Incompetence, and Event Scale 
appear to directly influence Public Response and ex-
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Table III. Examples of Events Scoring in Highest or Lowest 5% on a Subset of Model Variables 
Variable 
1. Exposure (range: 1-9, mean: 3.85) 
a. Low. Tractor trailer canying 246 containers of low·level radioactive waste through Long Island City, Queens, splits 
open as it passes below elevated subway track. No material leaked or spilled. 
b. High. New tests and surveys suggest that potentially harmful levels of radon gas may be contaminating homes in 
New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania well beyond Reading Prong information; radon is believed to cause from 
5000 to 20,000 of 100,000 lung-cancer deaths each year in U.S.; New York State Health Commissioner, Dr. David 
Axelrod, sees "very significant public health threat." 
2. Casualties (range: 1-6, mean: 1.71) 
a. Low. Uranium-processing plant north of Cincinnati, Ohio leaked a small cloud of radioactive uranium hexafluoride 
gas from cracked metal cylinder, no workers injured. 
b. High. Delta Airlines L-1011 Jumbo Jet with 161 people aboard crashes and explodes in violent thunderstorm as it 
tries to land at Dallas-Fort Worth Airport. 137 die, 24 survivors. 
3. Property damage (range: 1-9, mean: 4.66) 
a. Low. Three elderly individuals went to the same health clinic in Pittsburgh to receive influenza shots. All three died 
within 6 hr of being inoculated. 
b. High. First state-wide study of New Jersey shows that average acidity of rain, sleet, and snow to be at least 30 
times greater than normal. The most highly acidic rain comes from storms that contain winds coming from the 
Northwest section of the country, where much S02 is emitted. 
4. Number of stories (range: 0-2064, mean: 94.58) 
a. Low. Chartered bus canying homeless men from several cities in East and Middle West to Rajneesh religious 
commune in Oregon collides with car. One person dies, and 31 are injured in Notus, Idaho accident. 
b. High. Huge discharge of toxic chemicals into Rhine River confronts Europe with worst ecological disaster in recent 
years. 1000 tons of chemicals (including 8 tons of mercury) spill into Rhine after fire in chemical storage warehouse 
in Basel, Switzerland. 
5. Risk-reducing action (range: .5·-6.69, mean: 3.32) 
a. Low. A van and a pickup truck collide. Five people are killed, and four are injured. 
b. High. High levels of the cancer-causing pesticide EDB have been found in flour, pancake mixes, and other widely 
used food products. 
6. Perceived managerial incompetence (range: 1.84-7.24, mean: 5.02) 
a. Low. Manufacturer announces a voluntary candy-bar recall after tests show salmonella bacteria in several batches. 
b. High. High levels of the cancer-causing pesticide EDB have been found in flour, pancake mixes, and other widely 
used food products. 
7. Future risk (range: 2.38-6.43, mean: 4.45) 
a. Low. A major dam collapses. The water released kills 14 and devastates 1/2 million acres of land. 
b. High. Three hazardous waste and dump sites were recently added to four already known to exist around the same 
harbor, and dangerous chemicals have been found to be leaking into the groundwater. 
8. Economic impact (range: 0-8.5; mean: 2.12) 
a. Low. Chartered bus canying homeless men from several cities in East and Middle West to Rajneesh religious 
commune in Oregon collides with car. One person dies, and 31 are injured in Notus, Idaho accident. 
b. High. Times Beach, Missouri resident Lane Jumper says soil tests by Envirodyne engineers have found high 
concentrations of dioxin and other hazardous chemicals. 
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Event score 
9 
4 
9 
o 
551 
1.15 
5.08 
2.96 
6.60 
2.96 
6.01 
.5 
7.0 
plain 71% of its variance. Noteworthy is the finding that 
Casualties and Property Damage did not appear to di-
rectly influence Public Response. Finally, Event Scale 
and Perceived Managerial Incompetence directly in-
fluence Future Risk and explain 53% of its variance. 
All five exogenous constructs (constructs that are not 
causally dependent on other model variables) exert an 
indirect effect on Societal Impact because of their direct 
influence on either Media Coverage or Public Re-
sponse. 
To illustrate how "downstream" constructs are in-
fluenced by "upstream" constructs, the effects of pre-
dictor variables from the model in Fig. 2 were decomposed 
into total, direct, and indirect effects and are shown in 
Table VI. Based on the size of the total effects, Media 
Coverage and Public Response are major contributors 
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Table IV. Correlations Among Model Variables from Phase I 
~ 
" " ~ ~8 lij c ~ :::;l:! 
Cl 13~ ~ ~ .!l e > 0 ~ .;a .- u 
" ~..s 0 
'" ~ Q, Q, ~ 8 " "o! ~ u "- "- .-
Exposure I~ Area 
Casualties .19 -.11 
Propeny Damage .23 .58 .07 
Perceived Managerial Incompetence .25 .16 .06 -.01 
Future Risk .35 .61 -.10 .41 .31 
Number of Stories .37 .33 .36 .47 .17 
Duration .42 .43 .22 .46 .17 
Half-Life .37 .39 .17 .44 .12 
Political Involvement .49 .47 .05 .23 .54 
Worry .42 .56 -.04 .27 .56 
Risk-Reducing Action .46 .55 -.05 .30 .56 
Political Impact .46 .34 .30 .39 .40 
Economic Impact .48 .33 .36 .41 .39 
to Societal Impact. Event Scale also contributes a great 
deal to Societal Impact but does so through these two 
factors as well as through Future Risk. For example, 
the total effect of Event Scale on Societal Impact is 
comprised of its indirect effects through Media Cover-
age, Public Response, and Future Risk. The total ef-
fect was calculated as follows: 
(.35)(.32) + (.44)(.50) + (.66)(.24)(.50) =.41 
Observe that Perceived Managerial Incompetence has 
a larger influence on Societal Impact than does Cas-
ualties; however, it operates through its indirect ef-
fects. 
2.6.4. Corroboration Using PLS 
To corroborate the findings of the previous model, 
a PLS model was estimated using the same input vari-
ables. Its path coefficients are shown in Table V. As 
noted previously, in situations where sample size is small 
~ lii ·c lii a on Q, c .§ E 'u .§ ~ ... 
..!:l " ::> u ~ 0 c O! e 13 'E ~ .9 :::3 O! ~ ..!. u > ~ ~ c :; 0 ~ :; '0 ' 0 c ::> (;j ~ °B 0 E ::> - > 0 '0 Jl ::r: o c ~ u. Z Cl "-- ~< "-
.35 
.39 .87 ~ 
.40 .80 .89 
.55 .33 .35 
.64 .34 .38 .37 .84 
.58 .41 .44 .42 .83 .84 ~ 
.41 .65 .63 .51 .57 .54 .59 
.37 .67 .61 .53 .59 .53 .62 .95 
and multivariate normality is violated, PLS is more ro-
bust with respect to small sample size and violations of 
multivariate normality than the generalized least squares 
procedure used in the previous model. The PLS model 
does not have an overall measure of fit. However, the 
significance of the structural and measurement paths in 
the PLS model was evaluated nonparametrically by com-
puting the ratio of the jack-knifed path estimates to jack-
knifed standard errors. All such ratios were found to be 
extremely large, suggesting the viability of these paths. 
The measurement coefficients appear to be slightly larger 
than their counterparts in Fig. 2, while the structural 
coefficients appear in most cases smaller. Based on the 
evaluation criteria used under each estimation procedure 
and the similarity of their findings, it appears that the 
structure depicted in the covariance structure and PLS 
models works reasonably well. 
To examine the statistical replicability of the co-
variance structure and PLS models, 12 new Delphi 
panelists were chosen and information was again ob-
tained regarding the political and economic impact of a 
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Table V. Model Comparisons Across Samples Using Covariance Structure and PLS Analysis 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Combined 
Covariance PLS Covariance PLS Covariance 
Structural paths· 
ES -'> FRb .66c .54 .60 .54 .62 
PMl-'> FR .18 .19 .24 .28 .24 
C -'> MC .28 .24 .13 .24 .24 
PD -'> MC .32 .31 .33 .32 .38 
ES -'> MC .35 .31 .25 .31 .25 
ES -'> PR .44 .35 .13 .10 .26 
PMl-'> PR .42 .41 .60 .51 .52 
FR -'> PR .24 .29 .40 .45 .34 
C -'> SI .08 .24 .25 .36 .13 
PD -'> SI .15 .09 .15 .19 .15 
MC -'> SI .32 .35 .39 .29 .39 
PR -'> SI .50 .45 .43 .38 .48 
Measurement paths 
Exposure .68 .82 .58 .83 .66 
Area .94 .90 .96 .89 .94 
No. of stories .90 .94 .89 .94 .89 
Duration .99 .97 .97 .97 .98 
Half·life .92 .94 .89 .94 .89 
Political involvement .92 .94 .98 .96 .98 
Worry .94 .95 .83 .91 .92 
Risk.reducing action .93 .94 .89 .94 .95 
Political impact .97 .99 .97 .95 .96 
Economic impact .99 .99 .81 .95 .95 
Correlational paths 
ES ++ PDd .63 .49 .60 .49 .62 
ES ++ PMI .22 .23 .31 .41 .28 
Fit indices 
X2 90.20 None 84.70 None 84.10 
df 67.00 67.00 67.00 
p 
.03 .07 .08 
NFl .99 .99 .99 
a Structural path abbreviations: ES, event scale; PMI, perceived managerial incompetence; C, casualties; PD, property damage; FR, future risk; 
PR, public response; MC, media coverage; Sl, societal impact. 
b -'>, Causality. 
c All estimates have been standardized. 
d ++, Correlation. 
hazard. In addition, a new group of students was asked 
to provide information regarding risk perceptions and 
public response. 
Covariance structure and PLS models were esti-
mated using this new data and the results are shown in 
Table V. The evidence gathered from the across-sample 
and across-estimation method comparisons suggests that 
the model structure shown in Fig. 2 works reasonably 
well. The comparisons across samples indicate that while 
the substantive conclusions of the model appear to be 
upheld, the path estimates are in many cases different. 
This could be due in part to an instability of some mea-
sures of Event Scale, Public Response, and Societal 
Impact construct measures. 
To increase the reliability of the measures, the two 
samples were combined. Combining these samples ap-
peared reasonable because both were drawn from the 
University of Oregon student population only 7 months 
apart. Model coefficients and fit statistics are once again 
shown in Table V. The X2 statistic and the NFl for the 
model based on the combined sample indicate a good 
fit. 
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Table VI. Effect Decomposition for the Combined Model 
Constructs Totala Direcr Indirect" 
SOCIETAL IMPACfd 
Casualties .17' .08 .09 
Property damage .25 .15 .10 
Event scale .41 .00 .41 
Perceived managerial incompetence .23 .00 .23 
Future risk .12 .00 .12 
Media coverage .32 .32 .00 
Public response .50 .50 .00 
MEDIA COVERAGE 
Casualties .28 .28 .00 
Property damage .32 .32 .00 
Event scale .35 .35 .00 
PUBliC RESPONSE 
Event scale .60 .44 .16 
Perceived managerial incompetence .46 .42 .04 
Future risk .24 .24 .00 
FUTURE RISK 
Perceived managerial incompetence .18 .18 .00 
Event scale .66 .66 .00 
a Total effect is the sum of the direct effect and the indirect effect. 
b Direct effect is the effect due only to the predictor variable of interest. 
C Indirect effect is the effect due to the predictor's influence on inter-
vening variables which in tum influence the dependent variable of 
interest. These effects are multiplicative. 
d Dependent constructs are shown with capital letters. 
, Standardized effects. 
3. DISCUSSION 
3.1. Summary 
Our paper has emphasized the need for an inte-
grated approach to risk management that combines re-
search emerging from both the behavioral and management 
sciences. Addressing this need, we described two struc-
tural modeling approaches that are able to bring diverse 
types of risk information into a single model and that 
should be helpful in the construction of prescriptive models 
that seek to properly formulate risk decisions. 
We also investigated a number of predictions im-
plied by the social amplification of risk framework. Our 
findings support the contention that the behavior of the 
media and the public play crucial roles in determining 
the impact of a hazardous event. Each of these factors 
contributes significantly to an event's impact even when 
controlling for the event's scale and for harm to people 
and property. The physical consequences of an event 
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also strongly influence societal impact but do so pri-
marily through intervening variables. For example, the 
scale of the event exerts a strong effect on event impact 
but operates through its ability to stimulate media and 
public behavior. Likewise, the number of casualties 
moderately affects media behavior but has only a weak 
direct influence on societal impact. Perceptions of man-
agerial incompetence influence the public's response to 
a hazard to a degree approaching the scale of the event. 
Further, public judgment about managerial competence 
affects societal impact to a greater extent than does the 
number of casualties and to a similar extent as does the 
amount of property damage. These findings also support 
the claim that risk signal, depicted as perceptions of 
managerial incompetence and future risk, operates through 
its ability to stimulate public behavior and does not di-
rectly cause event impact. 
The implications of our findings suggest that fo-
cusing solely on the probability and magnitude of phys-
ical consequences may greatly underestimate the actual 
impact of an event. Misjudging event impact can occur, 
for example, by either failing to consider important ex-
ogenous variables (e.g., risk signal) or by failing to un-
derstand the paths through which these exogenous factors 
operate (e.g., ignoring intervening variables like media 
coverage). For instance, model estimates suggest that 
the public's assessment of how competently a hazard is 
being managed plays a more important role than number 
of casualties in predicting event impact. Thus, by con-
centrating only on the number of casualties it is possible 
to underestimate the impact of an event that causes few 
injuries but is perceived to represent gross managerial 
incompetence. Likewise, though the total effect of scale, 
casualties, and property damage on event impact is sub-
stantial, the direct effect of each is much smaller. Hence, 
ignoring intervening factors like media coverage and public 
response may cause forecasts of event impact to be in-
accurate. 
Understanding how people perceive different types 
of hazards may not only improve predictions of impact 
but may mitigate long-term consequences by fostering 
communication between risk managers and the public. 
The theory of risk amplification predicts that the societal 
cost of a hazardous event is determined, to a large ex-
tent, by what the event signals or portends. The findings 
of this study support the conclusion that when an event 
implies that the hazard is improperly managed or that 
the future risk is great, the public and its representatives 
will act to reduce this threat. The public in a sense ex-
amines the significance of the event while formulating 
behavioral intentions to tolerate the risk or take actions 
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against the risk and perhaps against those in charge of 
the risk. Lack of evidence linking the number of cas-
ualties and the amount of property damage to public 
response suggests the public does not use this informa-
tion alone as a cue to action. However, the public does 
seem sensitive to the scale of the event, particularly events 
affecting large areas. The scale of an event may, in the 
public's mind, be more diagnostic of personal risk than 
reports of the number of casualties. The Tylenol poison-
ings represent a potent example of public reaction to an 
event that is perceived as exposing large numbers of 
people to danger despite the fact that relatively few peo-
ple were harmed. Mitchell(17) examined the effect of these 
poisonings on the stock prices of Johnson & Johnson, 
Inc. and estimated a loss of $2.11 billion tosharehold-
ers. He placed the losses realized by other over-the-counter 
drug companies at about $4.06 billion. 
3.2. Study Limitations 
The risk events in this study were not selected ran-
domly but were chosen in accord with the taxonomy 
suggested by Hohenemser et al. (12) As a result, we can-
not rely on sampling theory to assess how close the sam-
ple covariance matrix conforms to some population matrix. 
However, the Hohenemser taxonomy is a reasonable 
representation of the world of hazards, and the model 
variables were approximately normally distributed across 
the chosen events. Even so, generalizations beyond this 
sample must be made cautiously and model estimates 
should be treated as more descriptive of sample char-
acteristics than inferential of population parameters. 
While this study has examined variables indicative 
of risk signal-namely, perceptions of managerial in-
competence and future risk-inclusion of other variables 
such as dread or familiarity may lead to a fuller portrayal 
of risk signal. Perceptions of managerial incompetence 
and threat from future risk are powerful motifs but may 
represent higher-order concerns relative to signals such 
as dread. 
Public response has been measured in this study by 
variables representing behavioral intentions. According 
to Ajzen and Fishbein, (18) the immediate antecedent of 
any behavior is the intention to perform the behavior in 
question. However, more research is needed to deter-
mine how well intentions predict public response to risk. 
Similarly, the behavioral intentions university students 
display toward a hazardous event may be different than 
those of the general population. 
The amplification of risk framework depicts the me-
dia as a potential amplification source and hence, the 
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media is predicted to exert a strong influence on people's 
perception of risk and their likely response. However, 
we were unable to examine this assertion because our 
survey may have been the only exposure respondents 
had to many of these events. Failure to capture these 
important influences undoubtedly affected our path es-
timates. The most likely effect was to overestimate the 
direct influence of media coverage on event impact. Event 
impact itself was only assessed by means of Delphi judg-
ments. Better modeling and analysis of impact is needed. 
3.3. Prescriptive Implications 
Understanding factors that contribute to the impact 
of a hazardous event and marshalling this insight to pro-
mote sound decision strategies will become increasingly 
important for risk managers. We have restricted our at-
tention to structural models; however, Burns and Cle-
men (IS) have shown how to convert a causal model to a 
decision analytic technique known as a Gaussian influ-
ence diagram. (19) Influence diagrams provide a vehicle 
for incorporating decision and criterion variables into a 
structural model, thus allowing the decision maker to 
move from a purely descriptive portrayal of the environ-
ment to a prescriptive analysis of the decision situation. 
In addition, the decision-analysis perspective can be of 
value in the early stages of developing the structural 
model by helping the researcher to identify and focus on 
issues important to decision makers. Hence, structural 
models and influence diagrams can be used in tandem 
to provide a more comprehensive approach to the man-
agement of risk. 
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